Theoretical Foundations of Political Dynasticism: Elite Theory and Patronage Politics

Abstract

This paper offers a theoretical analysis of political dynasticism by integrating elite theory and patronage politics to explain its persistence across democratic systems. While conventional studies focus on the empirical prevalence of dynasties, this research conceptualizes dynasticism as a structural and operational feature of modern electoral politics. Drawing on classical theorists like Pareto, Mosca, and Michels, as well as modern contributions by Mills and Bourdieu, elite theory helps explain the intergenerational reproduction of power among political families through inherited capital, institutional access, and symbolic legitimacy. Complementing this, the framework of patronage politics reveals how dynasties function as hubs of clientelist exchange, leveraging resources, networks, and party structures to maintain dominance. The paper develops a composite model demonstrating how elite reproduction and patronage mobilization intersect to reinforce dynastic control. It further explores the implications for democratic accountability, meritocracy, political inclusion, and institutional integrity, highlighting the systemic barriers faced by non-dynastic aspirants. While acknowledging counterarguments around stability and symbolic representation, the study concludes that political dynasties pose a fundamental challenge to democratic ideals, necessitating deeper institutional reforms. This work aims to reframe dynasticism not as a cultural anomaly, but as a predictable outcome of entrenched political inequality.

Keywords: Political dynasticism, elite theory, patronage politics, clientelism, democratic representation, political inequality.